The EU’s initiatives to regulate lobbyists: good or bad administration?

  • Michele Crepaz and Raj Chari Trinity College Dublin
Keywords: lobbying regulation, European Union, joint transparency register

Abstract

The Joint Transparency Register (JTR) represents a positive change from its predecessors, which can be explained based on ‘policy learning’. We support this argument by providing findings on two dimensions: First, we measure the strength of EU’s lobbying law compared to other political systems that have enacted such. We find that the EU’s initial attempts to regulate lobbying at the EP (1996) and Commission (2008) are less robust and efficacious. Second, we analyze the evolution of registrations of lobbyists from 2008 to 2013. We also consider developments in the automobile, airline and electricity sectors and highlight the corporations’ willingness to register and fully disclose lobbying costs. The paper closes by considering future challenges the JTR needs to address, before it can be considered an example of ‘good administration.’

Received: 10 April 2014
Accepted: 10 June 2014
Published online: 15 April 2016

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Author Biography

Michele Crepaz and Raj Chari, Trinity College Dublin
PhD Student and Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Trinity College Dublin
Published
2014-10-31
How to Cite
Crepaz and Raj Chari, Michele. 2014. “The EU’s Initiatives to Regulate Lobbyists: Good or Bad Administration?”. Deusto Journal of European Studies, no. 51 (October), 71-97. https://doi.org/10.18543/ced-51-2014pp71-97.