Appointing the members of the European Court of Auditors: towards better-qualifi ed management and more effi cient and timely decision-making?

  • Paul Stephenson Marie-Curie Research Fellow Centre d’Études Européennes, Sciences Po, Paris
Keywords: European Court of Auditors, collegiality, financial management, EU budget, administrative reform

Abstract

This article draws on the on-going debate at the European Parliament on the future role of the European Court of Auditors and the impact that its appointment procedure may have on the interinstitutional relations and credibility of this European institution. First, it analyses the context and challenges of reforming the Court, with a view to its collegial nature and the desired qualifications of its members. Second, it looks historically at collegiality as a crucial aspect of the Court’s organisational structure, and as a value/norm, addressing the debates on the way in which members are appointed. Third, it provides an overview of recent developments in the push for reform. Fourth, it considers future scenarios for new governance arrangements, acknowledging that effective and efficient management and decision-making is crucial for the Court’s legitimacy within the institutional framework of the European Union, but also essential to ensure financial accountability of the EU budget.

Received: 10 April 2014
Accepted: 10 June 2014
Published online: 15 April 2016

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Published
2014-10-31
How to Cite
Stephenson, Paul. 2014. “Appointing the Members of the European Court of Auditors: Towards Better-Qualifi Ed Management and More Effi Cient and Timely Decision-Making?”. Deusto Journal of European Studies, no. 51 (October), 99-120. https://doi.org/10.18543/ced-51-2014pp99-120.